The temporal distribution of autobiographical memory: changes in reliving and vividness over the life span do not explain the reminiscence bump by Janssen, Steve M. J. et al.
The temporal distribution of autobiographical memory:
changes in reliving and vividness over the life span
do not explain the reminiscence bump
Steve M. J. Janssen & David C. Rubin &
Peggy L. St. Jacques
Published online: 6 November 2010
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract When autobiographical memories are elicited
with word cues, personal events from middle childhood to
early adulthood are overrepresented compared to events
from other periods. It is, however, unclear whether these
memories are also associated with greater recollection. In
this online study, we examined whether autobiographical
memories from adolescence and early adulthood are
recollected more than memories from other lifetime
periods. Participants rated personal events that were elicited
with cue words on reliving or vividness. Consistent with
previous studies, most memories came from the period in
which the participants were between 6 and 20 years old.
The memories from this period were not relived more or
recalled more vividly than memories from other lifetime
periods, suggesting that they do not involve more recollec-
tion. Recent events had higher levels of reliving and
vividness than remote events, and older adults reported a
stronger recollective experience than younger adults.
Keywords Recollection.Vividness.Autobiographical
memory.Reminiscence bump.Aging
One of the most consistent effects observed in autobio-
graphical memory is the reminiscence bump. While people
have hardly any memories for events from the first few
years of life (i.e., childhood amnesia) and many memories
from the most recent years of their lives as expected from
normal forgetting, they also tend to recall more personal
events from the reminiscence bump, which is the period
between the ages of 10 and 30 years, than from adjacent
lifetime periods (Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998; Rubin,
Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986; Rybash, 1999).
The reminiscence bump is found in studies that have
lookedatthemostimportanteventsofpeople’slivesaswellas
instudies thathavelookedatmemoriesthathadbeensampled
withthe help of cue words. The particular location of the peak
of the reminiscence bump differs depending on how the
personal eventsare elicited. The peakin the distribution of the
most important events is located in the third decade of
people’s lives, whereas in the distribution of word-cued
memories it is located in the second decade (Rubin &
Schulkind, 1997). The reminiscence bump has also been
observed across a variety of studies including favorite books,
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DOI 10.3758/s13421-010-0003-xrecords and movies (e.g., Holbrook & Schindler, 1989, 1996;
Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2007;L a r s e n ,1996; Schulkind,
Hennis, & Rubin, 1999; Sehulster, 1996; Smith, 1994)a n d
memory for public events (e.g., Holmes & Conway, 1999;
Howes & Katz, 1992; Janssen, Murre, & Meeter, 2008,
Rubin et al., 1998; Schuman, Belli, & Bischoping, 1997).
Despite the consistency of the reminiscence bump, however,
none of the proposed mechanisms can successfully explain
its presence across studies.
Three accounts have been proposed to explain the
reminiscence bump, but these accounts are not mutually
exclusive (Rubin et al., 1998). First, the cognitive account
(Pillemer, 2001; Robinson, 1992) assumes that adolescence
consistsofmanyfirst-timeexperiences,suchasthe firstdayat
high school or the first driving lesson, and that these novel
events are used later in life as exemplars when people
experience similar events. Second, the identity-formation or
life-narrative account (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Fitzgerald, 1988, 1996; Rathbone, Moulin, &
Conway, 2008) argues that many self-defining moments,
which are vivid and emotional memories of personal events
that have a large impact on the identity of a person (Conway,
Singer, & Tagini, 2004), come from adolescence and early
adulthood. Third, the life-scripts account hypothesizes that
people recall prototypical life events when they are asked to
name the most important events of their lives (Berntsen &
Rubin, 2002, 2004;B o h n ,in press;J a n s s e n&R u b i n ,in
press; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson,
2009; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). These transitional events
are mostly positive, although they can sometimes be negative.
The positiveeventstendtooccur inearlyadulthood,while the
negative events can happen at any point in people’sl i v e s .
Although these three accounts can account for the
reminiscence bump in the distribution of the most important
life events, they cannot easily explain the increase in the
number of memories from adolescence elicited by word cues
(Conway & Haque, 1999;J a n s s e n&M u r r e ,2008;M a k i&
Naka, 2006; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). For example, the
reminiscence bump that results from word cues consists not
only of more novel, emotional and important events, but also
of more regular, unemotional and unimportant events. That
is, for word cues, there is the same proportion of novel,
emotional, and important memories in the bump as in
surrounding periods, suggesting that word-cued memories
of all kinds are more easily accessible from the bump period.
In contrast, if one cues participants by asking specifically for
important or emotionally positive events one produces a
bump. Thus, even if word-cued memories from the bump are
not more important or emotional, the most easily accessible
important and emotionally positive memories are from the
reminiscence bump (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004;R u b i n&
Schulkind, 1997). The type of cuing affects the properties of
the retrieved memories from the bump.
An important property of autobiographical and episodic
memory is that it allows us to subjectively recollect the
personal past, which refers to the ability to mentally time
travel to alternative temporal locations (Tulving, 2002).
Although autobiographical memory is generally associated
with episodic memory (Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993),
not all autobiographical memories of events are necessarily
episodic. For example, one might recall a personal event
without having the experience of traveling mentally back in
time and reliving the event (Brewer, 1986).
One frequently used method to distinguish the subjective
recollection associated with memory retrieval is the
remember/know task (e.g., Dewhurst & Conway, 1994;
Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990, 1991; Gardiner &
Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985). For example,
Rybash and Monaghan (1999) used these judgments to
examine the effect of the age at the time of the event. They
presented forty older adults with eighteen cue words and
asked them to describe for each word a specific event from
their lives. The participants subsequently dated these
personal events and indicated whether they remembered
or knew the event. Rybash and Monaghan found that the
temporal distributions of the remembered and known
events consisted both of recency effects and reminiscence
bumps. The reminiscence bumps were located in the period
in which the participants were between 6 and 15 years old.
Although several researchers have insisted that remem-
ber/know judgments do not reflect confidence ratings for
laboratory tasks (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Rajaram,
1993), for autobiographical memories, they seem to be
more closely related to the belief in the accuracy of the
memory rather than to the recollective experience (Rubin,
Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004). A
better measure of subjective recollection might therefore be
to ask participants directly if and how strongly they relive
personal events when they think about them. The property
of reliving is also closely linked to vividness, which refers
to the strength of visual imagery during retrieval. For
example, Rubin et al. (2003) found that highly relived
memories had almost always strong visual images. More-
over, reliving ratings are correlated with neural activity in
the visual cortex (Daselaar, Rice, Greenberg, Cabeza,
LaBar, & Rubin, 2008).
If personal events that occurred during adolescence and
early adulthood are indeed more episodic, then one should
find higher values for reliving and vividness for the events
that have occurred in those lifetime periods. The goal of the
present study was to examine the recollective experience, as
measured by reliving and vividness ratings, across the life
span of autobiographical memories elicited with cue words.
Recollection may depend on three temporal factors: the
participant’s age at the event, the age of the event, and the
age of the participant at the test. The focus of the current
2 Mem Cogn (2011) 39:1–11study, therefore, is to examine whether autobiographical
memories from the reminiscence bump have stronger
recollective experiences than memories from other lifetime
periods, whether recent memories are associated with
stronger recollective experiences than remote memories,
and whether younger participants have stronger recollective
experiences than older participants.
Age at the event
What makes memories formed in adolescence and early
adulthood so special then? Several studies have suggested
that the memory system performs optimally in adolescence
and early adulthood (e.g., Cerella & Hale, 1994;L i ,
Lindenberger, Hommel, Ascherleben, Prinz, & Baltes,
2004; Salthouse, 2004; also see Rubin et al., 1998, pp.
15-16). One alternative could be that memories from
adolescence and early adulthood are encoded better,
making them more resilient to changes over time in the
recollective experience and thus more likely to be recalled.
Age of the event
Rybash and Monaghan (1999) examined the age at the
event. One can also investigate the age of the event.
Cermak (1984) argued that recent personal events are more
likely to be episodic and associated with recollection, while
most remote memories are semantic. According to some
theories (e.g., Schooler, Shiffrin, & Raaijmakers, 2001)
episodic memories lose their contextual information over
time and become semantic memories. Following this line of
thought, one should find higher values for reliving and
vividness for recent than for remote personal events. In
addition, many theorists assume that episodic memories are
progressively modified in neocortical regions until they are
independent of the hippocampal complex (e.g., Alvarez &
Squire, 1994; Meeter & Murre, 2004; Murre, 1996, 1997;
but see, Rosenbaum, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2001).
Age of the participant
Young and older adults may differ in the recollective
experienceassociatedwithautobiographicalmemoryretrieval.
Mäntylä (1993) asked young (20-33 yrs) and older adults
(65-78 yrs) to make remember/know judgments about words
that they had previously learned. The older adults recalled
fewer words than the young adults, but this difference was
caused by responses that had been given remember judg-
ments. Young adults gave more remember responses than
older adults, but an equal amount of know responses. These
results are in line with other studies, in which older adults
tend to perform worse than younger adults on episodic
memory tests, while they often perform at the same level on
semantic memory tests (e.g., Craik & Jennings, 1992; Park,
2000). The recollective experience might also decline with
age, because older adults tend to recall less detailed
autobiographical memories (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur,
& Moscovitch, 2002; Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, &
Eustache, 2002; Piolino, Desgranges, Clarys, Guillery-
Girard, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2006; St. Jacques & Levine,
2007). On the basis of these results, one would expect that
younger participants give higher ratings of reliving and
vividness than older participants.
In contrast to these expectations, two studies of the
phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory
have found the opposite effect. Rubin and Schulkind (1997)
found that older adults, who were 70 or 73 years old,
reported higher ratings of vividness for important as well as
word-cued memories compared to young adults, who were
20 or 35 years old. This finding was confirmed by Rubin
and Berntsen, (2009) who had a sample of nearly 2,000
Danes, ranging in age from 15 to over 90, recall an
important event from last week or from their confirmation
day, which occurred when they were about 14 years old,
and rate the memory on 11 properties. For the recent event,
the correlation between the age of the participant and the
ratings were positive and significant (i.e., r > .06) for all but
one rating, with reliving and vividness having correlations
of .19 and .14, respectively. For the remote event, only four
properties had significant correlations, with reliving and
vividness having correlations of .09 and .04, respectively.
Thus, ratings of recent important autobiographical memo-
ries may be judged higher by older adults and at least some
ratings of word-cued and older important memories might
be too. Here, word-cued memories are tested and analyzed
with three temporal measures; age at the event, age of the
event, and age of the participant.
Internet research
The present study was conducted on the Internet, which
enabled us to collect results from a diverse and large
participant population (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John,
2004; Reips, 2000, 2002; Schmidt, 1997). The diversity of
the population allowed us to look at the effect of the age of
the participants at the test on a continuous scale, since we
were also able to collect the results of middle-aged adults,
who are often overlooked in these studies. The size of the
population gave us the opportunity to analyze the results in
smaller age bins. Past studies, which used age bins of ten
years to display the results, only found reminiscence bumps
in the results of participants who were 40 years or older.
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recall few events from the first decade (child amnesia) and
many events from the second decade (reminiscence bump).
They also recall many events from the last decade (recency
effect). To distinguish the reminiscence bump from a
constantly increasing function, one needs at least one data
point (between the reminiscence bump and the recency
effect) that has fewer memories (third decade). By having
more participants, one can use smaller age bins and,
possibly, identify the reminiscence bump in the results of
participants younger than 40 years (Janssen, Chessa, &
Murre, 2005).
Besides these advantages, there are also limitations to
psychological research on the Internet (Gosling et al., 2004;
Reips, 2000, 2002;S c h m i d t ,1997), such as multiple
submissions, self-selection bias, absence of physical experi-
menters, technical variance, and dropout rate. However, one
can attenuate the effects of limitations through careful study
design, as was implemented in the present study. For
example, the influence of multiple submissions can be
minimized by supplying passwords and allowing partic-
ipants to take the test more than once, and double entries
can then later be filtered out. Self-selection can be
controlled by the multiple site entry technique and by
extensive pre-testing. The website on which the test was
presented was promoted through other websites, search
engines, traditional media (magazines, newspapers, etc.),
and word of mouth. The third possible problem of
Internet-based research is the absence of a physical
experimenter, which could lead to problems during the
experiment if the instructions are unclear. Pre-testing the
experiment in a usability test and providing the possibil-
ity for feedback helps to improve the clarity of the
instructions. Another potential problem concerning web-
based research is the variance between computers,
browsers, and networks, which could lead to reliability
problems. Between-participants designs involving pre-
testing and random distribution of participants to exper-
imental conditions reduce these problems. The use of
within-participant designs would eliminate these prob-
lems entirely. The dropout rate can be reduced by giving
information about the duration of the experiment,
feedback about progress during the study, and immediate
feedback about performance.
Method
Participants
The study, which was called the Galton-Crovitz test, was
presented on the website of the University of Amsterdam.
Participants who had taken other tests on the website, such
as the Daily News Memory Test (Meeter, Murre, &
Janssen, 2005; Meeter, Ochtman, Janssen, & Murre, 2010)
or the Diary Study (Kristo, Janssen, & Murre, 2009), were
invited by e-mail to take part in the study. Other
participants had been invited by relatives, friends, or
colleagues, who had sent them a standardized e-mail at
the end of the study. Additional participants obtained the
address of the website from search engines or other
websites, newspapers and magazines.
In total 2341 Dutch participants between the ages of 16
and 75 (M = 47.77, SD = 14.31) completed the study. The
group consisted of 739 men and 1602 women, and more
than half of the participants had a university or an
equivalent degree (56.4%). The participants were divided
into twelve age groups of each five years. The number of
participants per age group is given in Table 1. The older age
groups consisted of relatively more men (F(11, 2329) =
6.30, MSE =0 . 2 1 ,p < .001) and of relatively more partic-
ipants with lower educational attainment (F(11, 2329) =
12.63, MSE = 4.14, p <0 0 1 ) .
Materials and procedure
The Galton-Crovitz cuing technique (Crovitz & Schiffman,
1974; Galton, 1879; Robinson, 1976, 1986) was used to
elicit autobiographical memories. Sixty-four cue words
were selected from Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan, (1968)
with values of 6.00 or higher for imagery, concreteness and
meaningfulness. The cue words were translated from
English to Dutch. The words and their translations are
given in the Appendix of Janssen, Chessa and Murre,
(2006).
Each participant received a random selection of ten
words, which were presented sequentially, and was asked to
describe the personal event that first came to mind by
writing a short description about the event. The events did
not have to be important, but they had to be specific. The
Age Group N Age Group N Age Group N
16-20 116 36-40 158 56-60 293
21-25 132 41-45 230 61-65 248
26-30 135 46-50 314 66-70 116
31-35 144 51-55 383 71-75 72
Young Adults 527 Middle-aged Adults 1085 Older Adults 729
Table 1 Number of participants
per age group
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response to the cue word “Blossom”, but a description of an
event that had occurred on a spring day would be correct.
After each cue word, participants answered an additional
question about when a news event had occurred. The data
from these public events was not the focus of the present
study and will therefore not be analyzed in the results.
When the participants had given ten descriptions for the
personal events and had dated ten news events, they were
provided with their descriptions and asked to date each
personal event. They could indicate the date on which the
event had occurred (e.g., ‘July, 2005’)o rt h e yc o u l d
indicate how long ago the event had occurred (e.g., ‘5 years
ago’). When they wanted to indicate the date, they could
select only the year in which the event had happened from a
drop-down menu, they could select the month and year, or
they could select the exact date (i.e., day of the month,
month, and year). When they wanted to indicate how long
ago the event had happened, they selected the number of
time units and the corresponding time unit (i.e., days,
weeks, months, or years) from drop-down menus. The
order in which the two answering formats were presented
on the computer screen was counterbalanced.
After participantshaddatedeachpersonalevent,halfofthe
participants indicated how strongly they relived the event
when they thought about the event on a five-point scale
(ranging from ‘no reliving’ to ‘as if it were happening now’).
They were told that they should indicate how much they
“experiencedtheeventagain”,“feltthesameemotionsagain”,
and“traveledbackintime”whentheythoughtabouttheevent
(Brewer, 1996). The other half of the participants rated how
vivid their memory of the event was on a five-point scale
(ranging from ‘not vivid’ to ‘very vivid’). They were told
that they should indicate if they could retrieve visual images
of the event and how easy it was to retrieve these images.
The low-to-high direction of these scales was counter-
balanced with half the participants getting high to low. We
specifically opted for a procedure in which participants
would rate the events after they had recalled them, so the
participants would not intentionally search for events that
they could relive strongly or which were particularly vivid.
At the end of the study, the subjects were thanked for
their participation and were explained the background of
the experiment. They were also given the opportunity to ask
questions or give comments about the study and to invite
relatives, friends, and colleagues, by sending them stan-
dardized e-mails.
Results
Given the considerations associated with Internet testing
(e.g., Gosling et al., 2004; Reips, 2000, 2002; Schmidt,
1997), several measures were undertaken to ensure quality
control. In order to reduce the likelihood of missing data,
the task was structured such that participants had to
complete each question before proceeding. The analyses
were restricted to questionnaires that were completed.
Participants could take the questionnaire as often as they
wanted, but only the results of their first participation were
analyzed. Thirty-six questionnaires were dropped from the
analyses, because they were the second or third participa-
tion. Furthermore, the results of 8 questionnaires that had a
coefficient of variation (i.e., the standard deviation divided
by the mean) lower than 0.1 on the ages of the events were
omitted. Finally, the results of 51 questionnaires were not
included in the analyses, since the participants had taken
longer than 60 minutes to complete them.
The questionnaires of the previously mentioned 2341
participants had met all criteria. These participants took on
average 23 min 45 s to complete the study. Completion
time was unrelated to the reliving and vividness ratings
(p = .33 and p = .86).
The reminiscence bump
We will first examine whether there is a reminiscence bump
present in the temporal distribution of the autobiographical
memories, before the effects of reliving and vividness are
investigated. A reminiscence bump in adolescence was
readily observed in the lifetime distributions. The partic-
ipants, who were between 16 and 75 years of age, were
divided into 12 five-year age groups (see Table 1). One
observed lifetime distribution (i.e., the proportion of
personal events per five years) was calculated for each of
these 12 age groups as shown in Fig. 1. To make the figure
clearer, the 12 distributions are divided over three panels.
The distributions of the age groups 26-30 and older all
show a peak in the period in which the participants were
between 6 and 10 years old. These peaks were not observed
in the distributions of the two youngest age groups 16-20
and 21-25, possibly because they were obscured by the
increased recall of recent events (Janssen et al., 2005).
The reminiscence bump becomes more pronounced
when one removes the increased recall of recent events
from the observed lifetime distributions. In Fig. 2,t h e
proportion of recalled events of the 15 most recent years
is given as a function of the age of the event, with the
proportion of events in each year plotted at the middle of
that year. Participants recalled many events from the most
recent year (24.0%) and fewer events from previous years
(9.1%, 4.2%, 2.9% and 2.3%). For every doubling of the
retention interval, the level of recall was reduced by
about half. The recent events were fitted with a power
function (Rubin & Wenzel, 1996) with constant .12 and
exponent -.96, (R² = .99).
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removed from each plot in Fig. 1 before the individual plots
from Fig. 1 were averaged to form Fig. 3. Only years for
which there were data were averaged. Thus, all participants
contributed to the early years, but fewer participants
contributed to the later years. These individual year values
were then adjusted to produce the five-year and ten-year
age bins. The proportions in this figure are displayed per
year (hollow circles), per five years (solid squares) or per
ten years (solid triangles). To keep the proportion shown in
the figure comparable, we display the proportion per year
for all three plots. The actual proportion of the total number
of memories is therefore five times of what is shown for the
five-year age bins and ten times the proportion of what is
shown for the ten-year age bins. Figure 3 shows that when
one uses age bins of different sizes, the peak of the
reminiscence bump can change, even when the same data
are being used. When the results are given in one-year or
five-year age bins, the peak of the bump is located between
the ages of 6 and 10, but when ten-year age bins are used,
the peak shifts to the second decade (11-20 years).
Reliving
Half of the participants was asked to indicate how much
they relived the personal events when they thought about
the events on a five-point scale that ranged from ‘no
reliving’ (1) to ‘as if it were happening now’ (5). In general,
participants reported moderate reliving when they thought
about the personal events (M = 3.30, SD = 1.29).
The reliving ratings will be examined in terms of (1) the
age of the participant at the event, (2) the age of the event
and (3) the age of the participant at the test. If a participant
was 40 years old when he or she took the test (age of the
participant) and he or she recalled an event that had
happened 30 years ago (age of the event), then this
participant was 10 years old when the event occurred (age
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Fig. 1 The observed lifetime distributions per age group
6 Mem Cogn (2011) 39:1–11at the event). These three variables are not independent.
The age of the event plus the age at the event equals the age
of the participant. The correlations between the age of the
event and the age at the event (r = -.70, p < .001), the age
of the participant and the age of the event (r = .40, p < .001)
and between the age of the participant and the age at the
event (r = .38, p < .001) are therefore strong.
There were small effects of age at the event, age of the
event, and age of the participant on reliving. Assuming that
the memories are independent units, these three correlations
are: .08, -.03, and .07, respectively (all ps < .001). For the
age of the participant, one can average all the memories of
each participant and report a correlation in which the
participant is unit of analysis. This correlation is: .11
(p < .001). For the two other measures, separate correla-
tions can be reported for different age groups to ensure that
the confounding with age group does not cause the effect.
For the age at event, if we divide the participants into the
three age groups as shown in Table 1, the correlations for
the young, middle-aged, and older adults are: .08, .04, and
.09, respectively (all ps < .001). For the age of event, the
correlations for the young, middle-aged, and older adults
are: -.07, -.02, and -.07, respectively (all ps < .001).
In order to present the underlying data for these analyses
in as direct a way as possible, the average amount of
reliving for events that occurred more than five years ago as
a function of the age at the event has been given in Fig. 4.
The striped bars represent memories of young adults, the
white bars represent memories of middle-aged adults, and
the black bars represent memories of older adults. As can
be seen, there are small effects on reliving that are
consistent with the reported analyses.
To examine the effect of the age at the event more
closely, events that had taken place in the period in which
the participants were between 6 and 20 years old were
compared to personal events from other lifetime periods.
Events from the reminiscence bump (M = 3.20, SD = 1.22)
were relived less than events that had occurred before the
age of 6 or after the age of 20 (M = 3.34, SD = 1.33),
t(11538) = 5.77, p < .001. Because most participants recalled
at least one event from within and outside of the bump
period, an analysis was also possible using participants as
the unit of analysis. For each participant, one average for
the reliving of the events that had occurred during the
reminiscence bump period and another average of the
events that had not occurred in that period were calculated.
Events from the reminiscence bump (M = 3.20, SD =0 . 9 5 )
were relived less than events that had occurred before the age
of 6 or after the age of 20 (M =3 . 3 5 ,SD =0 . 8 7 ) ,t(949) =
5.11, p < .001. In this last analysis, participants were
excluded if they did not recall any events from the
reminiscence bump period (N =1 4 8 )o rd i dn o tr e c a l la n y
events from the period before or after the reminiscence bump
(N = 33). To ensure that these results were not unduly
affected by memories that had occurred in early childhood,
the analyses were repeated comparing the reliving ratings of
events that occurred during the reminiscence bump period to
the ratings of events that had occurred after this period. For
the by memory and by participant analyses, the post-
reminiscence bump memories had mean reliving ratings of
3.37 (SD =1 . 3 2 ,t(10950) = 6.58, p < .001) and 3.40 (SD =
0.88, t(908) = 6.53, p <. 0 0 1 ) ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Vividness
The half of the participants who did not rate reliving was
asked to indicate how vivid their memories of the events
were on a five-point scale that ranged from ‘not vivid’ (1)
to ‘very vivid’ (5). The participants remembered their
personal events on average vividly. The average vividness
of their memories was 3.78 (SD = 1.23).
There were small effects of age at the event, age of the
event, and age of the participant on vividness. Assuming
that the memories are independent units, these three
correlations are: .19, -.14, and .06, respectively (all
ps < .001). For the age of the participant, one can average
all the memories of each participant and report a correlation
in which the participant is unit of analysis. This correlation
is: .10 (p < .001). For the two other measures, separate
correlations can be reported for different age groups to
ensure that the confounding with age group does not cause
the effect. For the age at the event, if we divide the
participants into the three age groups as shown in Table 1,
the correlations for the young, middle-aged, and older
adults are, respectively, .19, .23, and .15 (all ps < .001). For
the age of the event, the correlations for the young, middle-
aged, and older adults are, respectively, -.20, -.22, and -.15
(all ps < .001).
The average vividness of memories about personal
events that occurred more than five years ago as a function
of the age of the participant at the time of the event is given
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Fig. 4 The average reliving of memories about personal events that
occurred more than five years ago as a function of the age of the
participant at the time of the event for young adults (striped bars),
middle-aged adults (white bars) and older adults (black bars)
Mem Cogn (2011) 39:1–11 7in Fig. 5. Memories of young adults are represented by the
striped bars, memories of middle-aged adults are repre-
sented by the white bars, and memories of older adults are
represented by the black bars.
Personal events that had taken place in the period in
which the participants were between 6 and 20 years old
(M = 3.54, SD = 1.18) were remembered less vividly than
events from other lifetime periods (M = 3.90, SD = 1.23),
t(11686) = 15.13, p < .001. When for each participant one
average for the vividness of the events that had occurred
during the reminiscence bump period and another average
of the events that had not occurred in that period were
calculated, events that had happened when the participants
were younger than 6 years or older than 20 years (M = 3.84,
SD = 0.85) were on average remembered more vividly than
the events that had taken place when the participants were
between 6 and 20 years old (M = 3.48, SD = 0.97), t(973) =
12.14, p < .001. Participants, who did not recall any events
from the reminiscence bump period (N = 171) or who did
not recall any events from the period before or after the
reminiscence bump (N = 37), were excluded from this last
analysis. To ensure that these results were not unduly
affected by memories about events that had occurred in
early childhood, the analyses were repeated comparing
reminiscence bump memories to memories after the bump.
For the by memory and by participant analyses, the post-
reminiscence bump memories had mean vividness ratings
of 3.94 (SD = 1.21, t(11121) = 16.74, p < .001) and 3.92,
(SD = 0.85, t(938) = 14.38, p < .001), respectively.
Discussion
Few effects in the autobiographical memory literature are as
well-established as the reminiscence bump, but none of the
proposed mechanisms has successfully explained the
reminiscence bump in the distribution of word-cued
memories. In the present study, we investigated whether
memories about personal events that had occurred during
the reminiscence bump were associated with higher levels
of reliving and vividness compared to memories about
events from other lifetime periods. Participants recalled
more personal events from the period in which they were
between 6 and 20 years old. The reminiscence bump
peaked in the period in which the participants were between
6 and 10 years old, which is earlier than most studies that
used cue words have found, but there are several studies
which have found such an early peak (e.g., Cohen &
Faulkner, 1988; Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 2005;
Jansari & Parkin, 1996; Rybash & Monaghan, 1999). This
could be caused by differences in instructions. For instance,
when Rubin and Schulkind (1997) requested memories and
used an example of a childhood event, their plot resembled
that of Fig. 3. However, when they requested events and
used a recent event as an example, their plot peaked a
decade later. When the current results were presented in age
bins of ten years, the peak of the reminiscence bump was
located in the second decade of participants’ lives,
indicating that the size of the bins used can also have an
effect on the location of the peak.
The events from the reminiscence bump were on average
not given higher ratings of reliving and vividness. These
results are in correspondence with the results of Rybash and
Monaghan (1999) who had previously found that the
temporal distributions of personal events that had been
given remember or know judgments were identical. Thus,
as with measures of novelty, emotionality and importance
(e.g., Conway & Haque, 1999; Janssen & Murre, 2008;
Maki & Naka, 2006; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997), vividness
and reliving are not rated higher in the reminiscence bump.
The simplest explanation for this is that all these measures
are related to long lasting, highly available memories; such
memories are recalled frequently to cue words. Recent
memories follow the same principle, but because they have
suffered less forgetting, they are recalled with even more
vividness and reliving. The greater number of such long
lasting, highly available memories in the reminiscence
bump could be caused by the nature of encoding in that
period or by the nature of the events from that period or by
the role of these events in the life story or identity
formation, which could lead to better encoding and to
greater rehearsal.
The amount of reliving and the level of vividness were
affected by the age of the event and the age of the
participant at the test. First, recent events were relived more
and remembered more vividly than remote events. These
results are in line with the view that memories of recent
events tend to be episodic, whereas memories of remote
events are usually more semantic (Cermak, 1984). They are
also consistent with normal forgetting of the sensory and
emotional aspects of autobiographical memories that would
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8 Mem Cogn (2011) 39:1–11support the judgments of reliving and vividness. Second,
older participants reported higher ratings of reliving and
vividness than younger participants. This effect was not
caused by the age of the events, since older participants also
gave higher ratings for recent events. The present study is
not the first one to find this surprising result. Rubin and
Schulkind (1997) and Rubin and Berntsen (2009) found
that older adults gave higher ratings of vividness than
young adults. These findings on the phenomenological
ratings of memories contrast with measures of amount
recalled where older adults tend to perform worse than
young adults on episodic memory tests, while they often
perform at similar levels on semantic memory tests (e.g.,
Craik & Jennings, 1992; Mäntylä, 1993; Park, 2000). This
may represent a real difference between the amount of
recollection, a general trend for older adults to rate many
properties as higher, or a recalibration of the scales over the
life span. The personal events recalled in this study were
probably better recollected than most autobiographical
memories, since they were highly accessible. The existing
data do not provide an easy way to reconcile these different
accounts.
Three temporal effects were examined in this study.
Recent events were relived more and remembered more
vividly than older events, older participants gave higher
ratings of reliving and vividness than younger participants,
but memories from the reminiscence bump did not elicit
stronger feelings of reliving and were not remembered more
vividly. The results suggest that personal events from
middle childhood to early adulthood are not recalled
differently than events from other lifetime periods, there
are just more of them.
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